Monika Schnitzer
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  • Home
  • CV
  • Research
  • Initiatives
  • Teaching
  • Contact
  • Privacy Policy

Research

Research Interests

    • Innovation 
    • Multinational Enterprises
    • International Trade
    • Industrial Organization
    • Competition Policy

Current Research

How antitrust can spur innovation: ​Bell Labs and the 1956 consent decree

with Martin Watzinger, Thomas Fackler and Markus Nagler
Download /VoxEU/ Link to CEPR Discussion Paper

Is compulsory licensing an effective antitrust remedy to increase innovation? To answer this question, we analyze the 1956 consent decree which settled an antitrust lawsuit against Bell, a vertically integrated monopolist charged with foreclosing the telecommunications equipment market. Bell was forced to license all its existing patents royalty-free, including those not related to telecommunications. We show that this led to a long-lasting increase in innovation but only in markets outside the telecommunications industry. Within telecommunications, where Bell continued to exclude competitors, we find no effect. Compulsory licensing is an effective antitrust remedy only if incumbents cannot foreclose the product markets.
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Measuring the Spillovers of Venture Capital

with Martin Watzinger

Download full paper /VoxEU / ​Link to CEPR Discussion Paper

We provide the first measurement of knowledge spillovers from venture capital-financed companies onto the patenting activities of other companies. On average, these spillovers are nine times larger than those generated by the R&D investment of established companies. Spillover effects are larger in complex product industries than in discrete product industries. Start-ups with experienced inventors holding a patent at the time of receiving the first round of investment produce the largest spillovers, indicating that venture capital fosters the commercialization of technologies. Methodologically, we contribute by developing a novel definition of the spillover pool, combining citation-based and technological proximity-based approaches.

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Multinational firms and tax havens

with Anna Gumpert and James Hines
Review of Economics and Statistics 2016, Vol. 98 (4), 713-727
 Substantially revised version of "The use of tax havens in exemption regimes" 2011, NBER working paper 17644.


Multinational firms with operations in high-tax countries can benefit the most from reallocating taxable income to tax havens, though this is sufficiently difficult and costly that only 20.4 percent of German multinational firms have any tax haven affiliates. Among German manufacturing firms, a one percentage point higher foreign tax rate is associated with a 0.3 percentage point greater likelihood of owning a tax haven affiliate. This is consistent with tax avoidance incentives, and contrasts with earlier evidence for U.S. firms. The relationship is less strong for firms in service industries, possibly reflecting the difficulty of reallocating taxable service income.
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Big Banks and Macroeconomic Outcomes: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence of Granularity

with Franziska Bremus, Claudia Buch and Katheryn Russ
2013, NBER working paper 19093.
Does the mere presence of big banks affect macroeconomic outcomes? In this paper, we develop a theory of granularity (Gabaix, 2011) for the banking sector, introducing Bertrand competition and heterogeneous banks charging variable markups. Using this framework, we show conditions under which idiosyncratic shocks to bank lending can generate aggregate fluctuations in the credit supply when the banking sector is highly concentrated. We empirically assess the relevance of these granular effects in banking using a linked micro-macro dataset of more than 80 countries for the years 1995-2009. The banking sector for many countries is indeed granular, as the right tail of the bank size distribution follows a power law. We then demonstrate granular effects in the banking sector on macroeconomic outcomes. The presence of big banks measured by high market concentration is associated with a positive and significant relationship between bank-level credit growth and aggregate growth of credit or gross domestic product.


Publications

  • “Multinational Firms and Tax Havens” (with Anna Gumpert and James Hines), Review of Economics and Statistics  (2016), Vol. 98 (4), 713-727
  • “Trade liberalization and credit constraints: Why opening up may fail to promote convergence” (with Katrin Peters), Canadian Journal of Economics (2015), Vol. 48(3), 1099-1119
  • “Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade: Substitutes or Complements?” (with Martina Engemann and Katharina Eck), World Economy, (2014), 1507-1540.
  • “Financial Constraints and Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-Level Evidence” (with Claudia Buch, Iris Kesternich and Alexander Lipponer), Review of World Economics, 150 (2014), 393-420.
  • “Financial Constraints and Innovation: Why Poor Countries Don’t Catch Up” (with Yuriy Gorodnichenko), Journal of the European Economic Association, (2013), 1115-1152
  • “Successive Oligopolies with Differentiated Firms and Endogenous Entry” (mit Markus Reisinger), Journal of Industrial Economics, 60 (2012), 537-577
  •  “When is FDI a Capital Flow?” (mit Dalia Marin), European Economic Review, 55 (2011), 845-861
  •   “Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals” (mit Basak Akbel), Journal of Banking and Finance, 35 (2011), 1367-1379
  •  "Who is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and their Choice of Capital Structure", (mit Iris Kesternich), Journal of International Economics , 82 (2010), 208-218, Mathematical Appendix
  • “FDI and Domestic Investment: An Industry Level View” (mit Christian Arndt und Claudia Buch), Berkeley Electronic Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, (2010)
  • "Entry of Foreign Banks and their Impact on Host Countries", (mit Maria Lehner), Journal of Comparative Economics, 36 (2008), 430-452
  • "Organization of Multinational Activities and Ownership Structure" (mit Christian Mugele), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26 (2008), 1274-1289
  • "Technology transfer and spillovers in multinational joint ventures", (mit Thomas Müller), Journal of International Economics, 68 (2006), 456-468, (Appendix)
  • "Disorganization and Financial Collapse", (mit Dalia Marin), European Economic Review, 49 (2005), 387-408
  • "Die Privatisierung in Osteuropa: Strategien und Ergebnisse", Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik,  4(3) (2003), 359-377
  • "Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market", (mit Klaus Schmidt), Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 16(2) (2003), 473-505
  • "Creating Creditworthiness through Reciprocal Trade" (mit Dalia Marin), Review of International Economics,  11(1)  (2003), 159-174
  •  "The Economic Institution of International Barter" (mit Dalia Marin), Economic-Journal,  112 (2002), 293-316
  •  "Debt vs. Foreign Direct Investment: The Impact of Sovereign Risk on the Structure of International Capital Flows", Economica,  69 (2002), 41-67
  • "Comment on: Some Simple Economics of Genetically Modified Food, Comment" , (by Dietmar Harhoff, Pierre Régibeau and Katharine Rocket), Economic Policy, 33 (2001), 292-293
  • "Comment on: The Process of China's Market Transition (1978-1998): The Evolutionary, Historical, and Comparative Perspectives, Comment", (by Yingyi Qian), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156 (2000), 172-174
  • "Enterprise restructuring and bank competition in transition economies", Economics of Transition,  7 (1999), 133-155
  •  "On the role of bank competition for corporate finance and corporate control in transition economies", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,  155 (1999), 22-46
  • "Expropriation and Control Rights: A Dynamic Model of Foreign Direct Investment", International Journal of Industrial Organization,  17(8) (1999), 1113-1137
  • "Economic Incentives and International Trade" (mit Dalia Marin), European Economic Review,  42 (1998), 705-716, wiederabgedruckt in "The Economics of Barter and Countertrade", herausgegeben von Rolf Mirus and Bernard Yeung, Edward Elgar,  2001
  • "Hostile versus Friendly Takeovers", Economica,  63 (1996), 37-55
  • "Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade with Evidence" (mit Dalia Marin), American Economic Review,  85 (1995), 1047-1064, wiederabgedruckt in "The Economics of Barter and Countertrade", herausgegeben von Rolf Mirus and Bernard Yeung, Edward Elgar,  2001
  • "Breach of Trust in Takeovers and the Optimal Corporate Charter", Journal of Industrial Economics,  43 (1995), 229-259
  • "The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts" (mit Klaus Schmidt), Economic Letters,  48 (1995), 193-199
  • "Countertrade aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht: Theorie und Evidenz" (mit Dalia Marin), ifo-Studien: Zeitschrift für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung,  41 (1995), 119-134
  • "Dynamic Duopoly and Best Price Clauses", Rand Journal of Economics,  25 (1994), 186-196
  • "Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe" (with Klaus Schmidt), Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.17 (1993), 264-287.  


Books

  • "Contracts in Trade and Transition: The Resurgence of Barter" (with Dalia Marin), Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2002

Statements & Reports

  • Analyse der Beweggründe, der Ursachen und der Auswirkungen des so genannten Offshoring auf Arbeitsplätze und Wirtschaftsstruktur in Deutschland (mit Claudia Buch, Christian Arndt, Iris Kesternich, Anselm Mattes, Christian Mugele, Harald Strotmann), Gutachten erstellt im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Tübingen/München  2007
  • Non-Horizontal Mergers Guidelines: Ten Principles, A Note by the EAGCP Merger-Subgroup, (mit Marc Ivaldi, Bruce Lyons, John van Reenen, Frank Verboven, Nikos Vettas, Xavier Vives), erstellt für die Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy des Chief Economist, DG Competition, Europäische Kommission, Brüssel 2007